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This article aims to interrogate the attitudes of the US, the EU/EU-3, Russia and China, on Iran’s 
nuclear programme. The underlying question is whether there can be a consensus in the international 
community for a comprehensive settlement. In trying to provide answer to this question first, the article 
briefly reviews Iranian motives and foreign assistance in the development of Iran’s nuclear programme. 
Secondly, focusing separately on the US, the EU/EU-3, Russia and China, a comparative analysis is 
employed for delineating similarities and differences in their attitudes and concerns since the 1979 
Iranian Revolution. This article arrived at a tentative conclusion on the basis that the debate is likely to 
continue, as there is no common attitude toward Iran’s nuclear puzzle in the international community. 
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Iran’s nuclear programme – which Iran has stated is for peaceful/non-military purposes, 
that is energy production, whereas the Western countries regard it to be driven by military 
ambitions, has been a subject of international concern. In fact, since 2002 the present and 
future capacity of Iran’s nuclear programme has been questioned and evaluated by the 
international community. In this regard, considerable attention has been paid to Iran’s 
nuclear programme in security and strategic studies in recent years. 
Iran began investing in nuclear technology from the late 1950’s. Under the Pahlavi 
monarchy, Western countries assisted Iran in acquiring a nuclear infrastructure. However, 
following the Islamic Revolution there was a sudden halt in assistance, which forced Iran to 
look for other suppliers such as China and the former Soviet Union. Thereafter, Iran’s 
nuclear programme became a major issue for the US. After the discovery in August 2002 
that Iran had hidden its nuclear activities for the last eighteen years, it became a serious issue 
for the European Union (EU) and the international community. From then on, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the United Nations (UN) conducted 
inspections to document whether Iran produced uranium sufficient enough for the 
development of nuclear weapons. As a result, the UN Security Council has approved three 
sets of sanctions against Iran in 2006, 2007 and 2008 to suspend uranium enrichment–a 
process that can provide fuel for a nuclear reactor or fissile material for a nuclear bomb. 
The response of Iran is highly important in determining the nature and scope of the 
attitude of the international community. Iranian President Ahmadinejad claims that sanctions 
were based on false information, since Iran’s nuclear programme seeks only to generate 
electricity. 1  Furthermore, the rhetoric of President Ahmadinejad, particularly on Iran’s 
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nuclear programme and toward Israel – what US Secretary of State Nicholas Burns calls “the 
most abhorrent, irresponsible rhetoric of any global leader in many years,” has brought Iran 
closer to confrontation with the US. (MacLeod 2008a) Lately, State Radio of Iran reported 
that Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamani said on 18 February 2008, “God would 
punish Iranians if they do not support the country’s disputed nuclear programme.” 
Furthermore, he said, “They (the US) know that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon, and 
they (the US) are just trying to block the Iranian nation from achieving advanced 
technology.”2 
Despite Iran’s official position that seeks peaceful use of nuclear technology, the 
international community’s suspicion over Iran’s nuclear intentions has not changed since 
2002. Especially in the West suspicions and anxiety are considerably significant. The US 
appears to be the main country concerned with Iran’s nuclear programme. While the EU 
states – notably France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK), abbreviated as the EU-3 –  
have engaged in an effort to resolve the confrontation through diplomacy. As noted in the 
Economist on 2nd-8th February 2008,   
 
The Americans and Europeans, supported by Russia and China, promised that halt to 
enrichment would win Iran improved political and economic ties, talks on regional security and 
help with advanced, but less suspect, nuclear technology. 
 
Hitherto, we cannot talk about a common approach of the international community 
toward Iran’s nuclear programme. Thus, this article aims to examine the positions of the US, 
EU/EU-3, Russia and China on Iran’s nuclear programme. The underlying question is 
whether there can be a consensus for a comprehensive settlement that could bring about 
positive outcomes for regional peace. In trying to provide an answer to this question, the 
article begins by outlining the general Iranian motivations and then briefly reviews the 
history of foreign assistance in the development of Iran’s nuclear programme. Since there 
has been growing number of literature on the history of Iran’s nuclear programme (Kibaroglu 
2007; Bahgat 2006), rather than analyzing at length, a brief review of the literature in this 
context is presented. The article proceeds by in depth analysis of the international 
community’s attitudes toward Iran’s nuclear programme since the Islamic Revolution. After 
focusing separately on the attitudes of US, EU/EU-3, Russia and China, a comparative 
analysis is employed for delineating similarities and differences.  
This article arrives at a tentative conclusion regarding the strategic debate on Iran’s 
nuclear programme and what strategies should be chosen to deal with it.  It is claimed that 
the debate is likely to continue, as there is no common comprehensive agreement whether 
Iran is capable of acquiring a nuclear capability that would endanger the peace in the Middle 
East as well as much of the rest of the globe. Yet, it seems that there is a common agreement 
in the West that Iran must not acquire nuclear weapons. (Fitzpatrick 2006: 20-6) As 
diplomacy became tougher, Western states agreed to a unified effort to force Iran to change 
its nuclear policy. Russia and China though have some concerns and thus have approved the 
three UN resolutions but they prefer to maintain closer links with Iran and favor dialogue 
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rather than containment. Meanwhile, Iran consistently insists that its purposes are peaceful.   
 
 
2. GENERAL ANALYSIS OF IRANIAN NUCLEAR MOTIVES  
 
An analysis of the motivational aspect shows that there are several factors that led Iran to 
continue with its nuclear weapons programme. Firstly, Iran officially argues that its nuclear 
capability will be used as an alternative energy source. Thus, a major factor is avoiding 
international energy dependency. (Chubin 2006: 24-25; Ehteshami and Zweiri 2007: 128)   
The second motive is domestic economic considerations. Iran has been facing severe 
economic problems due to a number of factors. Despite the fact that Iran is the second largest 
oil producer in OPEC, it imports nearly 40% of its gasoline, mainly from neighboring Gulf 
States. (Herman 2006: 30; Berman 2007: 46) In addition, Iran has failed to reinvest in its 
domestic economy over the last 20 years, (Pollack 2006: 73-74) and is not able to receive 
foreign direct investment. Indeed, it is considered that a weak Iran cannot act independently, 
whereas a stronger Iran can have more self-confidence to interact with regional and global 
actors in the unipolar structure of the 21st century.  
A third motive is Iran’s own consideration, as a signatory to the NPT it has a right to 
acquire nuclear technology and know-how for peaceful purposes in line with Article IV. 
(Ehteshami and Zweiri 2007: 125) Fourth, the quest for a nuclear programme has become a 
matter of prestige. As Chubin highlights, “nuclear power is said to give Iran entry into an 
exclusive club” (Chubin 2006: 26) and a means to become a major regional actor. Besides, 
possession of nuclear technology may lead to an increase in Iran’s bargaining power vis-à-
vis the international community as the examples of North Korea, Pakistan and India have 
demonstrated.   
The fifth motive is domestic politics, which has two features. It is noted that the oil and 
natural gas revenues significantly support the Iranian economy and legitimize the regime. 
Also, the domestic situation shows that the Iranian public has given high support for Iran’s 
right to search for nuclear technology.  
The final motive is security, (Bahgat 2007; Chubin 2001) which is related with the 
deterrence of other states. (Takeyh 2004-05: 52-4) Yet, Iran’s security considerations were 
much clearer in the pre-1979 nuclear programme. In fact, after the regime change in Iraq, 
Iran has placed more emphasis on the peaceful purpose of its programme for energy 
production. (Guldimann 2007: 169)     
 
 
3. BRIEF HISTORY OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO IRAN’S NUCLEAR 
PROGRAMME 
 
Several characteristics can be identified about the foreign assistance to Iran’s nuclear 
programme. First of all, during the Cold War containing Soviet expansionism and securing 
oil reserves were two main concerns of US foreign policy in the Middle East. In this regard, 
the US encouraged Iran to acquire nuclear energy during the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah. 
Therefore a nuclear programme was designed to give the Shah an option of assembling a 
nuclear bomb if his regional competitors moved in that direction. (Dueck and Takeyh 2007: 
190)  As stated by Amuzegar (2006: 91), 
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Iran’s initial nuclear programme started in the mid-1950s, when Mohammad Reza Shah signed 
a civilian ‘atoms for peace’ agreement with the Eisenhower administration and later received an 
American research reactor for the Tehran Nuclear Research Center. 
 
Consequently, following the civil nuclear cooperation agreement of 1957 between the US 
and Iran, the US provided Iran with technical assistance along with its first experimental 
nuclear reactor. (Zunes 2006) Also, the US set up a thermal reactor in 1967 at the Tehran 
Research Center and trained Iranian technicians. (Zuhur 2006: 54) Meanwhile, in 1968, Iran 
signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which allowed Iran to develop research, 
concerning production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Accordingly, in the 
mid 1970s, the Ford administration continued to support Iran’s nuclear programme 
considering Iran as a US ally. (Linzer 2005) 
In addition to US assistance, France and Germany contributed in the development of 
Iran’s nuclear infrastructure under the Pahlavi monarchy. For example, in 1974 the French 
company Framatome in Darkhovin initiated construction of two water reactors. In 1975, Iran 
purchased a 10 percent share in Eurodif, a joint venture uranium enrichment company of 
France, Belgium, Spain and Italy. In 1976, the German firm Siemens constructed two nuclear 
facilities in Bushehr. Furthermore, Iran signed nuclear fuel contracts with Germany in 1976 
and France in 1977. (Kibaroglu 2007: 231) 
However, at the beginning of the 1980’s and during the war with Iraq, Iran did not 
continue with the nuclear programme. (Dueck and Takeyh 2007: 190) In the immediate 
aftermath of the Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of Iran, froze 
nuclear energy development, claiming that nuclear power was against the Islamic beliefs. 
Yet, with the recognition that modern military technology could make a difference in war 
with Iraq and due to the severe energy crisis in the post-revolutionary period, Iran renewed 
its intention to develop nuclear energy. (Kibaroglu 2007: 234) On the other hand, the US 
decided to end all the nuclear agreements with Iran in 1979. (Zuhur 2005: 54) US 
encouragement of Iran’s nuclear policy under the Shah regime turned into a preventive 
policy. In the 1990’s, the US imposed sanctions as Iran’s efforts intensified to expand its 
nuclear programme. Yet, due to a lack of evidence, the Europeans had some hesitations until 
2002. 
Looking at the recent history, the year 2002 is an important turning point for Iran’s 
nuclear programme. It was discovered that Iran possessed two undeclared nuclear facilities, 
which were located in Natanz and Arak. As a result, the US accused Iran of secretly seeking 
a nuclear weapons capability with foreign assistance. Following the discovery of the 
undeclared nuclear facilities, in 2003, the IAEA sent an inspection committee to Iran, 
(Chubin 2006: XV) which found out evidence pertaining to violation of the NPT. As a result 
of the negotiations carried out by the EU-3, Iran signed the Paris agreement in November 
2004 -suspending uranium enrichment programme. However, following election of 
Ahmedinejad as the new president in August 2005, negotiations have become more 
complicated.  
The conclusion that can be drawn from this brief review is that foreign assistance has 
played a crucial role in building Iran’s nuclear programme. Yet, the attitude of the Western 
countries has changed toward Iran’s quest for nuclear power following the Islamic 
Revolution. (Kibaroglu 2007) Due to this radical shift of Western attitude, Iran turned its 
interest to other potential states such as Pakistan, Argentina, Spain, Czechoslovakia, China 
and the former Soviet Union. For example, Iran signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with 





Pakistan and Argentina in 1987. And the former Soviet Union and China emerged as main 
suppliers. But the Chinese assistance ended at the beginning of the 1990’s due to US protests, 
and thus Russia has become the only potential supplier. (Kibaroglu 2007: 235; Bahgat 2006: 
310) There are concerns over the future evolution of the nuclear supply arrangements due to 
Iran’s active missile capabilities. As a result, this issue and its implications for global and 
regional security are likely to remain as a critical topic on the international agenda. 
 
 
4. ATTITUDES OF THE MAJOR COUNTRIES TOWARD IRAN’S NUCLEAR 
PROGRAMME 
 
In the following, we will examine the attitudes of US, EU/ EU-3, Russia and China 
towards Iran’s nuclear programme. Firstly, we will focus on the US attitude. The history of 
the US-Iranian relations have deteriorated following the 1979 Embassy Hostage crisis in 
Tehran and have yet to normalize. In fact, since the Reagan administration, the US has tried 
to delay Iran’s nuclear programme and to prevent substantial international cooperation with 
Iran’s nuclear industry. For instance, President Reagan prevented German cooperation with 
Iran. (Dueck and Takeyh 2007: 190) During the 1990s, President Clinton banned US 
companies from investing in Iran’s oil industry. (Bahgat 2001: 231-32) He signed the 1996 
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act3 to impose sanctions against foreign firms investing more than 20 
million dollars in Iran’s energy industry. In 1998, President Clinton waived sanctions against 
the French and Russian companies planning to develop Iran’s south oil and gas fields. 
(Freedman 1999: 72) These sanctions were applied in order to remove financial resources to 
develop a nuclear weapons programme. Furthermore, similar to the former Bush 
administration, the Clinton administration applied a policy of ‘dual containment’ to control 
both Iran and Iraq until 1998. According to this strategy instead of attempting to play Iran 
and Iraq off against each other, the US contained both. Moreover, the US included Iran in the 
list of ‘rouge states’ and among the states sponsoring terrorism during the Clinton 
administration.4 
Yet, with the election of reform-minded Iranian President Khatami in 1997, the US 
shifted its policy from ‘dual containment’ to ‘limited rapprochement.’ (Freedman 1999: 71; 
Katz 1998) Thus, there was more optimism about the improvement of relations between the 
US and Iran. Nonetheless, this optimism ended six years ago when US President George W. 
Bush labeled Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea as the ‘axis of evil’ – endangering peace 
in the globe. After 9/11 concerned with terrorism, proliferation and the availability of WMDs, 
organized crime and regional conflicts, President Bush changed US policy back to 
containment. (Dunn 2007)  
Iran’s nuclear programme became a more confrontational issue between the US and Iran 
with the 2005 Iranian presidential elections. The new President Ahmadinejad has given up 
President Khatami’s ‘dialogue of civilizations’ for more confrontational rhetoric, particularly 
on the US and Israel. In his speeches President Ahmadinejad indicated that Iran supports 
Hizballah and Hamas in their confrontation with Israel, accused the US over the occupation 
                                                          
3 See Congressional Record on Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, accessed on line at http:// 
www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_cr/h960618b.htm on 4 February 2008. 
4 For a discussion on the Rouge State Doctrine see Foreign Policy Briefing No. 65 accessed online at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb65.pdf on 8 February 2008. 
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of Iraq and teased the US on military action against Iran. Furthermore, President 
Ahmadinejad repeatedly said that Iran has the right and will not abandon uranium 
enrichment despite Western concerns. As a result, in the US National Security Strategy of 
2006, Iran is considered as the main country challenging the US by seeking to develop 
nuclear weapons, refusing to provide the IAEA access to nuclear sites and also, from the 
aggressive statements of President Ahmadinejad. Furthermore, in the same document it is 
indicated that the US is concerned about Iran’s violation of the NPT, sponsorship of 
terrorism, and its threat to Israel.5 
Accordingly, over the past few years, the Bush administration has argued for both 
‘regime change’ and for the increase of economic sanctions (Guldimann 2007: 173) to 
persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear programme. As the US does not have any diplomatic 
relations with Iran, it has allowed an alternative diplomatic track to be carried out by the EU-
3. (Dueck and Takeyh 2007: 202) Nevertheless, the US and Iran held their first official direct 
talks in May 2007 to discuss the security situation in Iraq. (Anderson 2007) Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice offered Iran direct talks on the disputed nuclear programme in 2006, 
on condition that Iran suspends its nuclear enrichment, but it was rejected by Iran. 
Secondly, we will focus on the EU/EU-3 attitude. The relationship between the EU and 
Iran from 1979 until the 2006 UN Resolution can be divided into three phases. The initial 
phase began with the Islamic Revolution and continued until the election of President 
Rafsanjani. Even though the EU Member States were still interested in Iranian natural 
resources and market, since the Islamic Revolution this relationship has deteriorated. Due to 
the support given by Western countries to the Shah, the new regime has developed a hostile 
attitude towards the West. Furthermore, the radical rhetoric of Khomeini against the West 
and Israel, and human rights abuses, contributed to a worsening of relations between Iran and 
the EU. Overall, throughout the initial phase, the EU had been critical about Iran’s human 
rights record, support given to terrorist activities and its nuclear programme.  
The second phase began in 1989 with the new Iranian President Rafsanjani. Some 
improvement in EU-Iranian relations occurred during Rafsanjani’s Presidency (1989-1997), 
which was marked by economic pragmatism through the realization of a number of 
economic reforms. (Noi 2005: 85) At the European Council Meeting in December 1992, the 
EU Member States decided to follow a common approach toward Iran, called the ‘Critical 
Dialogue.’ Through the ‘Critical Dialogue’ the EU Member States, particularly France, 
Germany and the UK, aimed to moderate Iran through negotiations on issues such as its 
nuclear programme, human rights record and terrorism. However, the EU’s official policy of 
‘Critical Dialogue’ toward Iran ended with the Mykonos Case in 1997, which revealed the 
connection between the Iranian government and the assassination of political opponents to 
the Iranian regime in Germany. (ibid. p. 87) 
Thirdly, the attitude of the EU-3 entered into a new phase with the election of President 
Khatami in 1997. During Khatami’s Presidency, a number of political and economic reforms 
were implemented, which led to the declaration of ‘Comprehensive Dialogue’ by the EU-3. 
The EU-3 believed that comprehensive engagement would further curb any extremism in 
Iran’s attitude on the nuclear issue. In fact, Iran’s nuclear programme had not led to any 
serious concern for the EU-3 until 2002. Yet, following the IAEA’s alarming findings, the 
EU-3 tried to persuade Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment programme and to sign the 
                                                          
5 The National Security Strategy of the US 2006, accessed online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ 
nss/2006/nss2006.pdf on 25 May 2007. 





Additional Protocol with the IAEA by offering Iran economic incentives. (Einhorn 2004: 22) 
Thus, the EU-3 intensively conducted negotiations with Iran to reach an agreement.  
As a result, in November 2004, negotiations between Iran and the EU were concluded 
with the Paris Agreement. With this agreement the Iranian government agreed to suspend its 
uranium enrichment and reaffirmed its commitment to the NPT, as well as to full cooperation 
and transparency with the IAEA, while the EU-3 agreed to respect Iran’s rights under the 
NPT. (Afrasiabi and Kibaroglu 2005: 260) However, the Paris Agreement was able to 
accomplish suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment programme only temporarily. In fact, 
Iran has restarted uranium enrichment at the Esfahan plant in August 2005.6 
It was noted that in order to convince Iran to freeze its uranium enrichment programme 
permanently, the EU-3 would need to improve bilateral trade relations. Indeed, it is 
considered that through intensive cooperation in trade, the credibility of each side would 
gradually increase in the eyes of the other, thus enabling further negotiations on the nuclear 
issue to be more successful. Accordingly, the EU-3 has preferred diplomacy in order to 
convince Iran to act in a transparent manner in line with international treaties. Unlike the US, 
the EU-3 argued that sanctions would not be effective by themselves. Yet, following Iran’s 
violation of the Paris Agreement, the EU issued a statement condemning in the strongest 
terms the comments made by President Ahmadinejad.7 As a matter of fact, in contrast to the 
expectations of the EU-3, with the election of President Ahmadinejad, negotiations between 
the two sides have been no more productive. 
Third, we will now focus on the Russian attitude. Following the Islamic Revolution, Iran 
has followed the ‘neither east, nor west’ worldview, so no cooperation was took place with 
the former Soviet Union. Yet in 1986, as Iran decided to improve relations, they signed an 
economic protocol. Following this agreement, in 1989 President Rafsanjani visited Moscow, 
which resulted in a major arms deal. Additionally, several other arms trade agreements were 
signed (1990-1995) between Iran and Russia, even though there were US objections. 
Eventually, as US objections intensified, Russia decided not to sell military equipment to 
Iran and signed the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin Pact with the US. Nevertheless, the Russian 
approach has changed since 2000, when Russia announced that it would restart arms sales 
and technological cooperation with Iran. (Jalali 2001) Following President Khatami’s visit to 
Moscow, an agreement was signed in October 2001, announcing an increase in Russian arms 
sales to Iran by up to 300 million dollars per year.  
Furthermore, despite US objections, at the beginning of the post-Cold War period, 
Tehran and Moscow established an arms trade and cooperation agreement (1992) for 
construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran. As Orlov and Vinnikov (2005: 50) stated; 
 
Nuclear cooperation would consist of constructing nuclear power plants for Iran, cycling 
nuclear fuel, supplying research reactors, reprocessing spent fuel, producing isotopes for use in 
scientific and medical research and training Iranian nuclear scientists at the Moscow 
Engineering Physics Institute. 
 
Following the 1992 agreement, in January 1995, a contract was signed between Iran’s 
Atomic Energy Organization and a Russian company, Zarubezhatomenergostroi to complete 
                                                          
6 “The EU’s Relations with Iran,” 5 February 2007, accessed online at http://ec.europa.eu/external_ 
relations/iran/intro/index.htm on 25 February 2007. 
7 Ibid. 
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construction of the Bushehr8 nuclear power plant. (ibid. p. 50) The Bushehr nuclear plant has 
been separate from Iran’s own enrichment facility at Natanz. It was initiated under the Shah 
and stopped following the Islamic Revolution. (Reynolds 2007) In the 1990s Russia has 
agreed to complete the project and to supply enriched uranium needed as fuel, recognizing 
that the Bushehr project, including the construction of two nuclear reactors, would grant a 
huge amount of money for the Russian economy.  
There were several reasons for increasing cooperation between Iran and Russia. From 
Iran’s vantage point, Russia has appeared to be the most appropriate partner in three areas. 
First of all, Russia has been one of the leading countries in nuclear energy technology and 
was seeking to “enhance its role as a global supplier.” (Vakil 2006: 58) Secondly, since Iran 
was experiencing a deteriorationin its relations with the US, Russia – concerned about a 
unipolar world system and hegemony of the US – might be more encouraging for Tehran’s 
desire to have nuclear energy. Thirdly, as Russia is not worried about human rights issues, 
Tehran’s poor human rights record might not concern Moscow, whereas the US and the EU 
have highly emphasized the issues of democracy and human rights. Lastly, unlike the US, 
Russia has not been worried about Iran’s support for terrorism.  
From the Russian vantage point, assistance of Iran’s nuclear programme coincided with 
Russian economic interests. Over 300 Russian companies have taken part in the Bushehr 
project, thus activating the Russian industries in nuclear research that would in return offer a 
serious input into its economy. (Takeyh 2003: 26) Additionally, this project provided many 
Russians with divergent employment opportunities. Besides economic benefits, Russia has 
been also considering its political interests. Firstly, Russia has been able to avoid Iran’s 
sponsorship of Islamist groups in the Commonwealth of Independent States, hence was able 
to preserve its influence over them. Accordingly, “Tehran has largely stayed out of the 
Islamist struggle in Chechnya.” (Takeyh 2003: 26-27; Orlov and Vinnikov 2005: 57) 
Secondly, since Iran has a considerable influence in the Islamic world, Tehran has been able 
to defend Moscow against “hostile resolutions passed by the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference.” (Orlov and Vinnikov 2005: 57)  Thirdly, Russia has been Iran’s main supplier 
of arms since 1989, although there was a break between the years 1995-2000 as indicated 
above. Thus, Russia has considered Iran as a valuable ally. Nevertheless, there are still some 
challenging issues such as the Caspian Sea energy resources. But, the two countries try to 
make sure that their different approaches on the challenging issues would not affect the 
continuity of their strategic partnership on the nuclear programme. 
Meanwhile, the Western states have disapproved of Russian assistance on Iran’s nuclear 
programme. Primarily, Russia has confronted the US. As it is pointed out by Orlov and 
Vinnikov (2005: 49); 
 
Since the mid-1990s, Russia had featured in virtually every mention of Iran’s nuclear 
programme.  Indeed, Russia is the only state to have openly cooperated with Iran in the nuclear 
field and has spent the better part of the last decade at the receiving end of fierce US criticism 
for its efforts.  
 
In order to prevent the Russian cooperation, both the Bush Senior and Clinton 
                                                          
8 Siemens, a German company, initially held construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant before 
the Islamic Revolution of 1979. However, in the aftermath of the revolution, Germany had to abandon 
its cooperation with Iran due to Western pressures. 





administrations employed a number of different deterrence strategies, including warnings to 
implement sanctions in trade. Furthermore, the Clinton administration exerted pressure on 
the Yeltsin administration to suspend its support for the Bushehr energy reactor. Yet, despite 
the pressure of Washington, throughout the 1990s Moscow resisted and maintained its 
cooperation with Tehran.  
However, the year 2002 can be regarded as a decisive moment in the attitude of Russia, 
because Russia was really astonished to learn about Iran’s secret nuclear programme. 
Moscow was deeply disappointed with the Iranian attitude of not revealing this information 
earlier. As a result, Russia decided to slow down the completion of the Bushehr project 
pointing out technical shortcomings. (ibid. p. 55) Nevertheless, it completed the Bushehr 
project in October 2004 (Afrasiabi and Kibaroglu 2005: 258), which is expected to provide 
electricity towards the end of 2008. Russia itself has enriched the uranium for Bushehr. 
Though the Western countries had hoped that Russia would delay the delivery of enriched 
uranium, it appears that there is less fear in Russia about Iran’s nuclear intentions.9 Yet, both 
the Western countries and Russia prefer to offer enriched uranium needed as a fuel rather 
than Iranian self-enrichment. 
Finally, we will focus on the Chinese attitude. Chinese-Iranian relations have accelerated 
since the mid 1990s, owing to a significant increase in the Chinese need for energy resources. 
Consequently, the US accused China of assisting Iran’s nuclear programme. Recently it has 
been discovered that China transferred sensitive materials to Iran in 1991 for enrichment 
without informing the IAEA, and trained Iranian nuclear technicians, but has canceled most 
of its assistance since 1997. (Bowen and Kidd 2004: 261-262; Cordesman and Al-Rodhan 
2006: 12-13)   
There are several factors determining China’s attitude. The first factor is China’s wish to 
secure a continuous flow of oil and gas from Iran. Thus, China’s growing demand for energy 
security has a large impact in forming its foreign policy toward Iran. Iran has been a major 
energy supplier for China. (Vakil 2006: 54) Oil imports from Iran to China amounted to 2 
billion dollars in 2003, representing more than 15 percent of its total oil imports, and it is 
expected that this amount would increase further. (Liangxiang 2005: 4) Bilateral economic 
relations are another factor determining the Chinese attitude. China is today Iran’s top trade 
partner and has committed to invest more in Iran’s oil and natural gas industry. (Zagorin 
2008) There has been an intensive trade relationship between the two states that amounts to 
approximately 10 billion dollars per year. In addition, China has made a large amount of 
capital investment in Iran. Thus, maintaining economic relations with Iran has been a crucial 
concern for China. (Shen 2006)  
On the other hand, maintaining cooperation with the US–as the main trade partner, has 
also been important for China. In this respect, it is rather difficult for China to keep both 
sides–Iran and the US as its partners, since it requires a delicate balance The rapprochement 
policy of China toward Iran has been of concern for  the US administration. China neither 
has wished to risk its trade relations with the US, nor to risk its energy and trade cooperation 
with Iran. Accordingly, there have been several instances in which China had to review its 
relations with both sides. One of these instances was observed when the Chinese company 
Sinopec-Chinese Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, decided to make an investment in 
                                                          
9 “Iran’da yerli nükleer santral” (National nuclear plant in Iran), BBC News, 30 December 2007, 
accessed online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2007/12/071230_iran_nuclear.shtml on 
15 Februray 2007.   
 ZEHRA NILUFER KARACASULU AND IREM ASKAR KARAKIR  10 
 
Iran in 2004 for more than 20 million dollars, although the US declared that it would 
penalize foreign companies that invest more than 20 million dollars in Iran. (Ogutcu and Ma 
2007: 111) What was more challenging is that, this investment was made at a time when 
tension has been dominating Washington-Tehran relations due to US efforts to address the 
Iranian nuclear issue in the UN Security Council.  
On October 28, 2004 a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ was signed between China and 
Iran on oil and gas. (Shen 2006: 51) This agreement stated that China would purchase 10 
million tons of oil from Iran annually in the next twenty-five years, in exchange for allowing 
Sinopec to develop Iran’s Yadavaran oil field. (Liangxiang 2005: 4-5) In the immediate 
aftermath of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding,’ China declared its opposition to 
addressing the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme in the UN Security Council. (Blumenthal 
2005: 12) Consequently, China has opposed the draft resolution in 2005, arguing that a 
solution has to be found by the IAEA. (Shen 2006: 64) Nevertheless, to avoid from running 
into conflict with the US, China voted for the referral of Iran’s nuclear programme in the 
IAEA Meeting10 on 4 February 2006, on the condition that the Council took no action before 
March.11 Other than Washington’s continuous pressure on Beijing, China’s adherence to the 
NPT was also influential in its voting attitude on the IAEA’s meeting.12  
It appears that China wishes to be perceived by the international community as a reliable 
state contributing to nuclear nonproliferation. Moreover, China wants to demonstrate itself as 
a powerful state contributing to international security. On the other hand, since China has 
been sensitive about external interference into its own internal affairs over human rights 
issues, it is thus more tolerable toward Iran’s claim on right to produce nuclear energy. (ibid. 
p. 58) China has then respected Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for civilian purpose 
while remaining committed to regulations defined by the IAEA, based on the NPT. 
 
 
5. COMPARISON OF THE MAJOR COUNTRIES’ ATTITUDES TOWARD IRAN’S 
NUCLEAR PROGRAMME: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
 
In the following, the US policies will be compared with those of Europe, Russia and 
China. Due to complexities associated with the nuclear proliferation and the events of 9/11, 
the Bush administration has reformulated US strategy on WMD proliferation. The new 
strategy included preemptive and even preventive military action. Furthermore, it looks for 
an alliance but will not be constrained by an alliance. In fact, the US National Security 
Strategies of 2002 and of 2006 have shown the Bush administration’s willingness to act 
preemptively vis-à-vis imminent threats. This is in the wider context of US security strategy 
today. In light of the growing problems of nuclear proliferation, since 9/11 the Middle East 
has become the focus of US foreign policy. The Bush administration continues its dual 
policy of ‘War on Terror’ and democratization of the region.  
Focusing specifically on Iran, the US has applied an ‘active containment’ policy. There 
are several characteristics of this policy. Firstly, the US has searched for the support of the 
                                                          
10 35 Member Board of Governors of the IAEA voted 27 against 3 to report Iran to the UN Security 
Council. 
11  “Iran reported to Security Council,” BBC News, 4 February 2006, accessed online at http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4680294.stm 17 May 2007. 
12 China signed NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) in 1992. 





other major powers to contain Iran. Secondly, the US has applied unilateral action, 
particularly in the international financial system to contain Iran. For instance, in mid 2007, 
the US prohibited transactions with three Iranian financial institutions; Bank Melli, Bank 
Mellat and Bank Saderat. To convince the European allies to intensify the UN sanctions on 
Iran, in October 2007, the US charged the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (Pasdaran) 
of providing material support for terrorist organizations. (Zagorin 2008) Furthermore, in 
October 2007, Burns, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, told in a briefing on 
Iran:  
 
Now, we very much hope that the Security Council will take up its responsibilities and pass a 
third Security Council resolution on the nuclear issue in the shortest possible time. But the 
United States, of course, has always reserved the right to act independently.  
 
Thirdly, the US has searched for the collaboration of Arab allies in the‘active 
containment’ policy. In January 2008, President Bush visited the Middle East to get support 
from Arab allies. During the Middle East trip, he told that extremists supported by the 
Iranian regime are threatening the stability in the Middle East and blamed Iran of sponsoring 
the terrorists groups, intimidating its neighbors and refusing to be transparent about its 
nuclear programme and ambitions.13  
However, in November 2007, the American National Intelligence Estimate stated that in 
2003 Iran halted its nuclear weapons programme in response to foreign pressure, and as of 
mid 2007 had not resumed work. Regarding this report, it can be argued that Iran currently 
does not have a nuclear programme, thus is not an imminent threat. If Iran will restart the 
stalled programme, it will not be until before late 2009, and probably later, to be technically 
capable of producing enough nuclear material to construct a bomb. 14  This information 
contradicts the Bush administration’s ‘active containment’ policy toward Iran (Hollis 2008: 
5), and reduces the significance of the necessity for new sanctions. (Baer 2007) Nevertheless, 
on 8 February 2008 in the International Herald Tribune, it was reported that Iran has begun 
to deploy a new generation of machinery–centrifuges known as IR-2, to produce nuclear fuel. 
In this respect, despite the NIE findings, there are hesitations in the US about Iran’s nuclear 
programme. Furthermore, US President Bush has stated his disagreement with the idea that 
the recent NIE lowered the threat coming from Iran. (Sanger and Sciolino 2005)  
In fact, tension so far between Iran and the US remains high over Iran’s nuclear activities. 
Whereas, Iran claims that the NPT permits Iran to enrich uranium for civilian use, the US 
insists that Iran’s so-called ‘peaceful’ programme is in reality “a cover for the ultimate 
development of nuclear weapons and a threat to its interests in the region as well as Israel’s 
security and survival.”15 The US is concerned that once technology has been mastered Iran 
might withdraw from the NPT. Thus, today, the US considers that heightened sanctions and 
increased isolation of Iran alongside diplomacy are required to stop Iran’s quest for nuclear 
capability.16 The Bush administration also keeps the military option–including air strikes on 
                                                          
13  “President Bush discusses Importance of Freedom in the Middle East,” accessed online at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/01/2008011-1.html on 12 February 2008. 
14 “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007. 
15  The National Security Strategy of the United States 2002, accessed online at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html on 28 January 2007. 
16 For more information on recent US policy toward Iran see: Nicholas Burns, “United States Foreign 
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nuclear facilities, on the table, and if necessary would act alone to defend its interests. 
The increase of tensions between US and Iran has both political and economic 
consequences, which might negatively affect the interests of EU countries, such as the rise of 
petroleum prices and a regional security dilemma. The Europeans also want to avoid another 
war in the Middle East. Moreover, there are converging views between the US and the 
EU/EU-3 on the seriousness of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Both want to prevent Tehran from 
acquiring nuclear weapons. They agree that a unified effort is required to address the Iranian 
nuclear threat. In this regard, along with the US, the EU/EU-3 demands Iran to act in 
accordance with the decisions of the IAEA and the UN Security Council, and to continue to 
exert pressure on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities permanently. However, 
unlike the US, which keeps sticks by the efficiency of tough sanctions and even military 
option, the EU/EU-3 has avoided a hot conflict believing that an isolated Iran would be 
radicalized. Thus, the EU has preferred diplomacy. This strategy of the EU has also been 
influenced by the attractiveness of “Iranian oil, the large market it offers, and its strategic 
location in the Persian Gulf and as a gateway for natural resources from Central Asian 
countries.” (Simbar 2005: 65) In short, the EU has applied a policy of ‘conditional 
engagement’ or ‘constructive engagement’. Though the EU has been critical about Iran’s 
human rights record, support given to terrorist activities and its nuclear programme, it has 
aimed at improving Iranian behavior through diplomatic coercion. (Bowen and Kidd 2004: 
268; Freedman 1999: 62) 
Nevertheless, recognizing that the diplomatic option was far from helpful in building any 
cooperation between the international community and Iran, and worried by Iran’s attitude, 
the EU has recently changed its attitude on imposing sanctions.17 Consequently, the EU acted 
along with the US and supported a UN resolution in November 2005 on the human rights 
situation in Iran.18 Furthermore, the EU agreed with the US to impose economic sanctions on 
Iran in line with UN Resolution 173719 adopted on 23 December 2006, banning trade with 
Iran in all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to the 
country’s enrichment activities. (Leopold 2006) Yet, with respect to the option of military 
action, the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana told that the EU is not considering 
military action.20 
The second UN Security Council Resolution 1747 passed on 24 March 2007,21 including 
a ban of Iranian arms sales and the freezing of assets of several Iranian revolutionary leaders. 
In March 2007, the Council of EU emphasized the fact that Iran had not complied with the 
                                                          
Policy Toward Iran,” 29 March 2007,accessed online at http://www.state.gov/p/us//rm/2007/82374. 
htm on 10 February 2008. 
17 For a recent detailed analysis of the EU policy vis-a-vis Iran’s nuclear programme see: Sauer (2007). 
18 “UN resolution on the Human Rights situation in Iran,” 21 November 2005, accessed online at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/gashc3841.doc.htm on 12 December 2007 
19 Resolution 1737 called for the enforcement of sanctions mainly including measures to prevent the 
provision to Iran of technical assistance of training, financial assistance or other services and the 
transfer of financial resources or services related to Iran’s nuclear program, while excluding any 
military action. 
20 “US, EU split on handling nuke defiance,” The Washington Times, 30 April 2006, accessed online at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/world/20060...20513-3903r.htm on 17 March 2007. 
21 Resolution 1747 aimed at imposing further sanctions on Iran and it reaffirmed that Iran must take the 
steps required by the IAEA Board. 





terms of the UN Security Council Resolution 1737 and reasserted its support for the UN 
Security Council. At the same time, the Council of EU reaffirmed its continued support for 
efforts to find a negotiated long-term solution.22 However, UN Resolution 1803,23 which was 
approved on 3 March 2008, has reflected the international community’s ongoing serious 
concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme. 
Despite concerns of the West, China and Russia have shown reluctance to implement 
sanctions against Iran. The Russians are claiming that there is no evidence of an Iranian 
nuclear weapons programme. Yet, two contradictory positions are observed in Russia’s 
attitude. On the one hand, Russia is Iran’s main nuclear partner and accepts its rights 
provided by the NPT; even one might say that it defends Iran’s nuclear programme in order 
to maximize its domestic interests. On the other hand, Russia has concerns about the 
intentions of Iran. Yet, it prefers negotiations since the mutual relationship has been 
economically and politically beneficial for them. Unlike the US, Russia argues that 
cooperation with Iran makes it easier to monitor its programme for the international 
community. In this regard, together with China, Russia voted for the referral of Iran’s nuclear 
programme in the IAEA Meeting on 4 February 2006, on the condition that the Council took 
no action before March.24 Nonetheless, when the pressure of the international community 
rose in the aftermath of the February 2006 IAEA meeting, Russia offered Iran to continue its 
nuclear programme on Russian territory, (Vakil 2006: 58) which was backed by the 
international community.25 Iran has refused this proposal claiming that it is their right to 
enrich uranium for peaceful purposes on its own territory, yet also appearing positive that 
some, but not all of its nuclear fuel can be produced outside Iran. (Bozorgmehr 2006)  
On 16 October 2007, President Putin visited Tehran, the first visit to Tehran by a Russian 
president since World War II, to attend the Summit of the Caspian Sea. (Saralayeva 2007) 
During the Summit, President Putin said that, ‘peaceful nuclear activities must be allowed 
and cautioned against using force to resolve the dispute over Iran.’ 26  (Penketh and 
Sheikholeslami 2007)  Yet, he refused to confirm whether Moscow would supply nuclear 
fuel to Iran’s nuclear plant at Bushehr once it is completed.27  
It is noted that although Russia has some concerns, despite growing US pressure, prefers 
to remain silent. Thus, it can be argued that Russia’s policy is in pursuit of the most effective 
means of maximizing its national interest and establishing Russia as a respected international 
player, especially in the Middle East and Central Asia. 
In fact, Russia and China have insisted that everything provided to Iran has been for 
                                                          
22  24 March 2007, accessed online at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/ 
pressData/en/declarations/93281.pdf on 18 March 2007. 
23 Resolution 1803 imposes a new round of sanctions against Iran that tightens restrictions on Iran’s 
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, increases vigilance over Iranian banks, urges to inspect cargo 
going into and out of the country and requests IAEA to report on whether Iran has complied with 
demand to suspend uranium enrichment. 
24  “Iran reported to Security Council,” BBC News, 4 February 2006, accessed online at http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4680294.stm on 17 May 2007. 
25 “Is the international community behind Russia’s plan?,” Council on Foreign Relations, 28 February 
2006, accessed online at www.cfr.org/publication/9985/ on 11 March 2007. 
26  “Russia backs Iran nuclear rights,” BBC News, 16 October 2007, accessed online at http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7046258.stm on 20 November 2007. 
27 Ibid. 
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peaceful purposes only. Yet, mainly due to American pressure China canceled most of its 
assistance to Iran. Today, China faces a serious dilemma with respect to Iran’s nuclear 
programme. On the one hand, China’s growing demand for energy and its economic interests 
makes Iran a strategic partner. Hence, China does not want to be a part of US-led pressure 
group to implement sanctions which would risk its national interests. On the other hand, 
maintaining good relations with Washington also carries vital importance for China, since 
the US has been China’s key trading partner. Acting outside the US would challenge China’s 
relations with Washington, which might also damage Chinese national interest. Thus, until 
now, China has abstained from using its veto power at the UN Security Council. (Vakil 
2006: 56) To conclude, similar to Russia, China prefers diplomatic efforts and dialogue 
rather than sanctions. Overall, despite the international community’s hesitations, China, 
similar to Russia, wants to counter US unilateralism and its global hegemonic intentions, by 





This analysis on the attitudes of US, EU/EU-3, Russia and China has shown that there is 
no common comprehensive agreement on the solution towards Iran’s nuclear puzzle. The US 
sees a mature and serious Iranian nuclear threat to develop by the year 2010. Official US 
policy is to leave all the options on the table, as well as using diplomatic activity through the 
EU-3 and sanctions through the UN Security Council. Yet, the US in particular has problems 
in convincing the international community that Iran is a grave threat to the Middle East 
security as well as to global security, due to mistakes done in the Iraq case. The EU, though 
acknowledges the right of Iran to develop civil nuclear energy but also suspects that Iran is 
pursuing nuclear weapons. The EU has been the main international actor offering a coercive 
diplomatic approach to contain the Iran’s nuclear programme, which has not succeeded yet. 
But this cannot be denounced as a complete failure. The EU is in a position to push the 
international community’s attitudes on this issue towards more dialogue, even if it cannot 
impose its will in Tehran.  
The EU’s effort for ‘critical dialogue’ with Iran which aimed to solve the crisis through 
direct negotiations seemed to work well especially when Iran agreed to abandon its nuclear 
programme in early 2004. However after the election of President Ahmadinejad, Iran’s 
nuclear programme has become more problematic. With a new approach, the EU acted with 
the US in taking the Iranian nuclear issue to the UN Security Council in order to have an 
approval for the imposition of a ‘stick’ policy through economic sanctions. Though their 
vantage point appears to become closer with the US, it is not identical. Since the 1990’s the 
US has favored ‘an active containment’ policy, hoping to isolate the Iranian regime, thereby 
causing a ‘regime change’ in Iran. As part of its ‘active containment’ strategy, the US 
supported a number of sanctions ranging from political to economic and repeated references 
to military action. Yet, the US has little independent diplomatic or economic leverage over 
Iran, and needs the support of the international community to give meaning to any threat of 
economic lost. The EU has resisted the US calls to intensify the extent of sanctions against 
Iran, which would go beyond the resolution of the UN Security Council. The EU has 
preferred a ‘constructive engagement’ policy.  It has acted more or less in a united fashion, 
but since it had lasted long, some internal divisions occur, as is already happening today with 
the declarations of the new French President Sarkozy. Though France has been rejecting US 





efforts to isolate Iran, recently President Sarkozy has indicated that Iran’s nuclear 
programme would be the cause of the biggest crisis on the international scene, and that they 
will work jointly with President Bush to convince Iran to give up its nuclear programme.28  
Russia and China, on the other hand, do not see Iran as an existential threat. The Russian 
and Chinese approaches might be a sign of resisting US hegemony and control over the 
Middle East and Central Asia. This might be the reason for their strengthened economic, 
political and diplomatic relations with Iran in the post-Cold War period. Russia supports the 
IAEA’s continued investigations and wants to take into account the progress achieved so far. 
China also favors diplomatic efforts.  
For its part Iran has been emphasizing honesty and sincerity of its cooperation with the 
IAEA. President Ahmadinejad has repeatedly told that Iran would never abandon its purely 
peaceful programme. Yet, the nuclear issue has become highly politicized in Iran. There 
exists a widely shared national consensus and public belief that Iran has right to enrich 
uranium for peaceful purposes, if not for nuclear weapons. (Gheissari and Nasr 2005: 186) 
There is a divergence of opinion between hard-liners allied with President Ahmadinejad, 
who support Iran’s search to become a nuclear power, and pragmatists who search for 
political benefits from the West and might accept limits on Iran’s nuclear programme. 
(MacLeod 2007a) Hardliners are closely associated with the Supreme Leader Khamanei. 
They have enormous influence on national security planning through the command of key 
institutions such as the Revolutionary Guards, the judiciary and the Guardian Council. 
(Takeyh 2004-05: 55) Hardliners are not necessarily afraid of sanctions and coercion. In 
contrast, pragmatists accept certain restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme. Pragmatists do 
not call for the halt of the programme, but support work within guidelines of the NPT. In 
other words, pragmatists want to sustain Iran’s nuclear programme while maintaining its 
international relations. (ibid. p. 56-57) In the last decade, opposition to Ahmadinejad has 
risen above the traditional split in Iranian politics between pragmatic conservatives and 
reformists. Opposition has evolved around Karroubi, a moderate cleric, and Rafsanjani, a 
former President. (MacLeod 2007a) Western diplomats say that the UN sanctions might 
challenge hardliners, and thus pragmatists might gain more support.29 Yet, in October 2007, 
President Ahmadinejad has replaced Iran’s pragmatic conservative top nuclear negotiator 
Larijani with his ally (MacLeod 2007b) though Larijani had been criticizing Ahmadinejad’s 
more provocative position, but not nuclear programme itself. (Guldimann 2007: 171) 
Anyhow, Larijani was in favor of reviving talks with the EU. (MacLeod 2007a) Yet, as the 
possibility and need for compromise with the EU has become a part of Iranian discourse, 
voices of pragmatists might be more assertive in the future. 
To conclude, this analysis demonstrates that the attitudes of the international community 
have not been monolithic. Yet after years of having different approaches, there has been a 
shift for a common position among the Western countries since 2006, though not a total one 
because the EU opposes the option of a military strike. This ‘Western approach’ can be 
differentiated from the Russian and Chinese approaches. Russia and China have supported 
diplomatic bargaining strategy of the EU-3 rather than imposing sanctions. Considering the 
overlapping issues of concern, this article puts forward an optimistic scenario that might lead 
                                                          
28 “Bush and Sarkozy Declare Iran Aim,” BBC News, 7 November 2007, accessed online at http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7083339.stm on 11 November 2007. 
29 For a discussion on understanding effects of the international demands on Iranian domestic policies 
see Fahri 2005: 20-21; Farhi 2001: 35-55. 
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to a successful solution on Iran’s nuclear puzzle, based on the EU’s method of diplomacy. 
Nevertheless, no real solution is expected in the short term, but there can be an opportunity 
under a new American administration along with a new government in Iran after 2009, since 
the new US President will be elected in November 2008, and the new Iranian President will 
be elected in mid-2009. As discussion of relations with the US has become more specific in 
Iran in terms of open calls for direct relations, and as already some contact has begun on 
issues related to Iraq, there is more reason to be optimistic. After US elections, there might 
be reconsideration on the question of how to deal with Iran’s nuclear puzzle. The optimistic 
scenario may be the next US administration’s opt for staying on the diplomatic track and 
reestablishment of the European locomotive role in the short-run, and Washington’s 
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